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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUN "filED
STATE OF GEORGIA

(')

IN OFFICE
Q~

JUN 1 8 2010
EZGREEN ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,
GP CELLULOSE LLC (FORMERLY)
KOCH CELLULOSE, LLC), and
BLUEYELLOW LLC,
Defendants.

DEPUlY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNlY GA

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action File No.
2009-CV-168743

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On May 26, 2010, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. After hearing the arguments made by
counsel, and reviewing the briefs submitted on the motion and the record in the case,
the Court finds as follows:

I. Factual Background
Don Moore, founder of Plaintiff EZGreen Associates, LLC ("EZG"), invented a
system to grow grass using a cellulose-based fabric, seed, fertilizer, and other additives
("engineered seed system" or "the Product"). On April 30, 2004, EZG and GeorgiaPacific Corporation ("GP") entered into a contract permitting GP to manufacture, market,
sell and distribute EZG's engineered seed system until June 30, 2014 ("the
Agreement"). The Agreement obligated GP to use "commercially reasonable" efforts to
market the Product. On May 12, 2008, GP sent EZG a one-page "termination letter,"
which EZG signed and returned. The termination letter stated that "[t]he Parties herby

. 1

C)

agree to terminate the Agreement and all rights, obligations, and liabilities thereunder."
In its Complaint, EZG alleges that Defendants breached the Agreement by failing to
produce the Product and failing to use "commercially reasonable" efforts to market the
Product during the years before the termination.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is premised on three arguments.
First, Defendants contend that the termination letter is a release which bars any claims
based on breach of the Agreement. Second, Defendants argue that the damages EZG
seeks were not enumerated in the Agreement, and that even if they were, those
damages are too speculative and uncertain to warrant recovery. Finally, Defendants
contend that EZG failed to give notice of the alleged breach as required under the
Agreement.

II. Summary Judgment Standard
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 911-56 when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be
tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
warrant summary judgment as a matter of law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga.
491,491 (1991).

III. Release
A release is governed by the same rules of construction as govern any written
contract and, therefore, "is to be construed according to the intent of the parties." U.S.
Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Industries, Inc., 264 Ga. 295, 298 (1994). "Since contracts
must be construed according to the intention of the parties at the time of their execution,
it will not be presumed that parties intend to contract away their legal rights in regard to
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a subject matter not clearly appearing therein." lQ. Where no ambiguity exists in the
language of a release, the court will interpret that language based on its plain meaning.
O.C.GA § 13-2-3.
The Court finds that the letter sent from GP to EZG On May 12, 2008, which EZG
signed and returned and which stated that "[t]he Parties herby agree to terminate the
Agreement and all rights, obligations, and liabilities thereunder" is unambiguously a
termination of the parties' obligation to continue to perform the contract and nothing
more. Therefore, EZG did not execute a release of any claims arising under the
Agreement, and summary judgment on this basis is not warranted.

IV. Damages
Defendants attack the issue of damages on two fronts. First, Defendants argue
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that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius precludes recovery of monetary
damages because the Agreement did not explicitly provide for them. Second,
Defendants argue that EZG cannot recover damages because those alleged damages
are too uncertain. Both arguments fail.
In dealing with the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio a/terius, great caution
should be used. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McFarley, 191 Ga. 334, 345-346 (1940).
The maxim is "far from being a rule," and at best, it is a "description, after the fact, of
what the court has discovered from context." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
Moreover, O.C.GA § 13-6-6 explicitly provides that every injured party in a breach of
contract action has a right to damages. In other words, in a breach of contract action,
once the plaintiff shows the existence of a legally enforceable contract and presents
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evidence from which a jury could find that defendant breached that contract, the
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defendant is not entitled to summary judgment even if the plaintiff fails to present
any admissible evidence to establish the amount of actual damages flowing from
the breach. D.C.G.A. § 13-6-6; Eastview Healthcare, LLC v. Synertx, Inc., 296 Ga.
App. 393, 398-399 (2009); Poe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 F.Supp.2d 1472, 1477
(1998)(applying Georgia law). Accordingly, the fact that the Agreement fails to list
damages as a possible recovery for breach of the Agreement does not foreclose EZG's
claims for breach of the Agreement.
Defendants' argument that damages in this case are too uncertain is equally
unpersuasive. D.C.G.A. § 13-6-2 provides that "damages recoverable for a breach of
contract are such as arise naturally and
according to the usual course of things
from
J
.
such breach and such as the parties contemplated, when the contract was made, as the
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probable result of its breach." Moreover, the Court finds that, while requiring proof and
explanation, and while subject to the rigors of cross examination and the rules of
evidence, the damages EZG seeks could "be proved with reasonable certainty."
Graham Bros.' Const. Co., Inc. v. C. W. Matthews Contracting Co., Inc.,159 Ga. App.
546 (1981). Thus, summary judgment based on this argument is also improper.
V. Notice
GP argues that EZG failed to comply with the notice provision of the Agreement,
thereby barring a breach of contract claim. Paragraph 7.3(a) of the Agreement
provides, in relevant part:

i)

"[I]f EZGreen believes that GP has not made a commercially reasonable
effort ... , then EZG by written notice to GP may within thirty days .. .identify
the specific performance criteria upon which EZG's notice is based. [If GP
has not cured within 90 days], EZG may then amend the provisions of
this Article ... " (emphasis added).
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At no point does the Agreement require EZG to give notice. When the language of a
contract is unambiguous, the court will enforce the contract's clear terms. Caswell v.
Anderson, 241 Ga. App. 703, 704 (2000). The word "may" as used in this Agreement
shows that notice under Paragraph 7.3(a) was permissive, not mandatory. Thus, the
Agreement gave EZG the option to give GP notice of an alleged breach; it did not
require such notice.
Even if the Agreement were construed as requiring EZG to give notice of an
alleged breach to GP, EZG did so in the form of a letter dated January 27, 2006,
alleging that GP had failed to make "commercially reasonable efforts" to market the
Product.
VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
DENIED. The stay of discovery ordered on March 31, 2010 is hereby lifted. Discovery

in this case shall close on Friday, September 17,2010.

SO ORDERED this 18th day of June, 2010.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Copies to:
Counsel for Plaintiff:
Andrew H. Stuart
Stuart Law Group, LLC
1775 The Exchange, Suite 130
Atlanta, GA 30339
Thomas C. Jessee
Jessee & Jessee
P.O. Box 997
Johnson City, TN 37605
Thomas D. Dossett
Todd & Dossett, P.C.
134 West Center Street
Kingsport, TN 37660
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Counsel for Defendants:
Chamberlain Hrdlicka
Gary S. Freed
David N. Dreyer
191 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Thirty-Fourth Floor
Atlanta, GA 30303-1747
404-659-1410
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